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Labour Market Policy in the Crisis: The UK in Comparative Perspective 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines labour market policy measures adopted to counteract the effects 
of the current economic crisis, comparing the UK policy response to reactions of 
governments in other developed countries. It shows that despite having entered the 
crisis with one of the least developed packages of policies to support the unemployed 
of any country, the UK has done unusually little to bolster provision in this field, 
despite the social and economic benefits increased investment would bring. In the 
light of this, the paper critically revisits the UK’s status since the late 1990s as a 
labour market policy ‘success story’. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Until the real economy effects of the recent financial crisis began to bite, 
unemployment per se had become something of a non-issue in British social policy. 
With policy attention having shifted to the problem of inactivity, governmental 
initiatives in the labour market were more focused on supporting apparently 
inexorable employment growth by coaxing a variety of ‘workless’ groups back into 
work with a mixture of carrots (financial incentives to make work pay and 
individualised job search assistance) and sticks (increasingly conditional benefit 
regimes for all working-age recipients of social transfers) (Clasen, 2007). This was in 
stark contrast to many of the UK’s European neighbours, where weaker employment 
performances had kept both unemployment benefit provision and more resource-
intensive support for labour market reintegration higher on political agendas, albeit 
increasingly accompanied by a focus on ‘activation’ (Kohnle-Seidl and Eichhorst, 
2008). 
 
With unemployment having risen somewhat faster in the UK than in many countries 
since 2008, it would not be unreasonable to expect that the gulf that had opened 
between it and many of its principal trading partners in the priority accorded to 
support for the unemployed might at present be beginning to narrow. This paper 
suggests, however, that to date the reality is rather different. Reviewing the main 
measures that have been put in place to cope with the labour market effects of the 
current economic crisis across a selection of comparable countries, it shows that the 
UK continues to be conspicuous in its relative policy inaction in this field. Not only 
did the UK enter the current recession with the least supportive policies for the 
unemployed of any Western European (EU15) country, but its government has 
furthermore proved among the most reluctant to improve these, even temporarily, in 
the light of the current economic conditions. 
 
The paper is structured in three sections. Section 1 provides a brief overview of the 
labour market policy profiles of selected developed countries at the onset of the 
recession, emphasising the economic as well as social consequences of variations in 
the generosity of benefit provisions for the unemployed. Section 2 then reviews the 
permanent and temporary modifications to the eligibility and entitlement parameters 
of these systems that have been enacted since 2008, as well as related changes in 
short-time working or ‘partial unemployment’ regulations and discretionary spending 
on active labour market policies. Section 3 concludes with some critical ‘reflections 
from the crisis’ on the UK’s status as an apparent labour market policy success story 
since the late 1990s. 
 
The labour market policies of developed countries at the onset of the crisis 
 
Though the period since New Labour’s first election victory in 1997 has in some 
respects seen considerable change in British welfare policy, it has also been a period 
that has confirmed and consolidated the UK’s already established position as a labour 
market policy low spender. As figure 1 shows, of the most developed countries only 
the USA invests less public resources, as a percentage of national wealth, in labour 
market policy measures. Already a low spender in 1997, the UK has furthermore 
reduced its efforts since then, albeit by less than many other countries. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Labour market policy expenditure is of course partly driven by high unemployment 
rates, through an automatic ratchet effect on benefit expenditures as well as inevitable 
political pressures for the expansion of discretionary measures. In countries such as 
Belgium, France or Germany, higher levels of investment in labour market policy 
partly reflect these countries’ relatively poorer labour market performance, at least in 
terms of job creation, over the last decade. British miserliness in this policy area 
cannot be explained away entirely by low problem pressures, however. In 2007 
unemployment, measured according to the ILO definition, was around a third lower 
than the British rate in both Denmark and the Netherlands, and yet levels of 
investment in labour market policy were in each country around four times as great. 
 
The limited commitment to supporting the unemployed in the UK comes out even 
more clearly with respect to the unemployment benefit system. The cross-national 
comparison of unemployment benefit generosity raises a number of methodological 
problems, but the OECD composite replacement rate indicator1 at least gives some 
suggestion of how much income security is on average provided under the 
arrangements prevailing in different national contexts. Figure 2 reveals that by 2007 
the UK benefit system had become the least generous of all the most developed 
countries, with average replacement rates having fallen below even those of Greece 
and the USA in the period since the late 1990s. As both Oxfam and the TUC have 
recently pointed out, nothing has been done under New Labour to slow the decline in 
the level of unemployment benefit relative to average earnings that began under the 
previous Conservative administrations (Oxfam, 2009; TUC, 2009). A comparative 
perspective highlights that the UK is furthermore out of step with other countries in 
this regard. The only countries where there have been more significant declines in 
unemployment benefit generosity over the last decade are Denmark and the 
Netherlands, where average replacement rates were previously 8 to 9 times higher 
than in the UK, and where they remain considerably above the OECD average. By 
contrast, in most developed countries replacement rates have remained broadly stable 
since 1997 despite falling unemployment, and in a few traditionally less generous 
countries such as Italy and Portugal, average replacement rates have actually been 
considerably increased in recent years. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
In the 1990s the dominant labour market policy discourse in the developed world 
presented unemployment benefit mainly as a ‘passive’ policy instrument, emphasising 
the potentially negative impact of benefit provision on the functioning of labour 
markets (e.g. OECD, 1994). Things have changed somewhat since the early 2000s, 
with the increasing interest – especially in Europe – in the notion of ‘flexicurity’, 
which emphasises the role of adequate benefit provision combined with job-search 
assistance and training measures in enhancing labour market mobility and job-
matching, and more broadly in facilitating the sustainable development of more 
flexible labour markets (Viebrock and Clasen, 2008; Jørgensen and Konhshøj 
Madsen, 2007). Comparative empirical research confirms these and other efficiency 
effects of good unemployment insurance – such as the creation of positive incentives 
for skill acquisition - at least as convincingly as its disincentive effects (Sjöberg, 
2008). Without even speaking of the social impact of such limited state support for 
the unemployed, it is therefore far from clear that Britain’s restrictive benefit regime 
(see box 1) is economically virtuous. 
 
Box 1 about here 
 
With the onset of the economic crisis there has been renewed attention to another 
positive economic function of unemployment benefits that underscores this 
conclusion: their role as ‘automatic stabilisers’ of consumer demand in the face of a 
sharp economic downturn. While taxes on income and earnings also play a significant 
role in stabilising household demand during recessions (Dolls et al., 2009), research 
from the USA has suggested that unemployment insurance benefits are far more 
efficient in this respect (Aurbach and Feenberg, 2000). The very low level of 
unemployment benefits in the UK has thus deprived the British economy of a natural 
fillip during the current recession, and meant that far more work has been required of 
discretionary fiscal stimulus measures than in countries like France or Germany 
(Coats et al., 2009a, p. 47). Furthermore, in these countries and others the policy 
response to the current crisis has included not only the ‘active’ measures that have 
been centre-stage in the UK, but also a series of improvements and additions to their 
already more generous benefit provisions. 
 
Labour market measures since 2008 
 
In Britain, the main message of the government regarding labour market policy in the 
recession has been that little really needs to change in the established policy approach. 
The 2008 pre-budget report thus argued that “reforms to Jobcentre Plus and 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) since the late 1990s have provided a strong regime that 
will enable the UK to meet the challenges of rising unemployment” (HM Treasury, 
2008, p. 89). A welfare reform bill, proposing to further extend job search 
requirements, enhance and personalise benefit conditionality and deepen the 
involvement of private and voluntary providers in labour market reintegration that is 
currently being piloted in the Flexible New Deal, was published in January 2009, and 
continues its progress through Parliament largely unchallenged, despite having been, 
in Frank Field’s words, “designed for the land of the never-ending boom” (Field, 
2009). 
 
Initiatives that have been more explicitly designed with recessionary times in mind, 
meanwhile, have focussed almost entirely on those measures classified as ‘active’ by 
the OECD. Increased investment has been pledged to help Jobcentre Plus cope with 
an upsurge in job seekers, and an employment subsidy scheme paying employers a 
one-off ‘golden hello’ upon hiring those who have been in receipt of JSA for 6 
months was unveiled in January 2009. The 2009 budget additionally pledged that 
from January 2010 all under-25s who have been unemployed for 12 months will be 
guaranteed a job, training placement or skill-training for at least 6 months through the 
‘Future Jobs Fund’. This ambitious measure was however not costed, and was 
accompanied with a promise – or threat? – that the government will work with future 
placement providers to “determine how participation in one of these options could be 
made mandatory” (HM Treasury, 2009, p. 96). 
 
With or without such self-consciously ‘tough’ policy framing, increased investment in 
active labour market policies such as employment subsidies and personalised job 
search assistance has been a feature of governments’ response to the crisis across the 
developed world (see European Employment Observatory, 2009, pp. 12-16; Mandl 
and Salvatore, 2009, pp. 18-22 for full reviews). The Spanish government has for 
example introduced a measure providing employers with a subsidy of up to the 
maximum unemployment benefit rate payable for three years upon the recruitment of 
an unemployed worker; a similar but slightly less generous scheme has been launched 
in Greece. In France, a temporary social contribution holiday has been implemented 
for all very small firms (with less than 10 workers) hiring in 2009, a budget has been 
released for 100 000 extra targeted subsidised employment contracts in 2009 and a 
pre-existing measure known as the Professional Transition Contract (Contrat de 
Transition Professionelle, CTP), which provides intensive help with job-search over a 
12 month period during which the beneficiary is also entitled to higher benefit 
payments (see below), has been extended to new groups of workers and additional 
geographical areas. The Swedish government has invested considerable extra 
resources in the public employment service to improve personalised job search 
assistance, and earmarked an equivalent sum to finance an employment subsidy for all 
so-called ‘new start jobs’. The Dutch government have created 33 regional mobility 
centres where firms, trade unions and job-placement companies will cooperate to 
ensure the rapid professional integration of unemployed workers. These mobility 
centres are one of a range of measures proposed by a specialty appointed crisis team 
set up to “make use of the economic crisis as an opportunity to modernise the labour 
market” (EIRO, 2009). 
 
Comparing the magnitude of these measures, or the broader stimulus packages in 
which they have been developed, is difficult (Coats et al. 2009b; Saha and Von 
Weizsäcker, 2009). There is, however, little evidence that countries like the UK with 
weaker automatic stabilisers have adopted considerably more ambitious discretionary 
stimulus packages (Dolls et al., 2009). Of the developed countries, the UK is 
furthermore the one that has concentrated most of its economic stimulus on 
generalised tax cuts, through the temporary VAT reduction announced in late 2008, to 
the detriment of a more balanced package with greater emphasis on employment 
measures (Coats et al., 2009b). Neither the scale nor the content of the active labour 
market policies introduced by the British government are exceptional in comparative 
perspective, therefore. 
 
Where Britain is an outlier, however, is in the almost complete absence of any 
improvement of ‘passive’ income support measures in its package of labour market 
policy measures. Improvements in benefits for lower-income families with children 
(Child Tax Credit) and for the elderly (advanced uprating of the Basic State Pension 
and additions to winter fuel payments) have been announced, an already planned in 
the level of Child Benefit was brought forward, and the budget for Social Fund crisis 
loan scheme has been increased. But beyond a modest increase in the maximum level 
of statutory redundancy pay, the cost of which is supported directly by employers, 
nothing has been done on a national level to improve benefits for those becoming 
unemployed.. 
 
In other developed countries the story has been very different. One instrument on 
which much government activism has focused has been schemes to subsidise short 
time working or ‘partial unemployment’. Under these arrangements firms can reduce 
the working hours of employees for a given period with a collective fund (often the 
general unemployment insurance fund) covering a proportion of the worker’s salary 
and/or social insurance contributions for the un-worked days. These instruments were 
in existence prior to the crisis in many European countries, but have been adapted and 
extended since its onset. In Germany, the structural short-time working measure was 
extended from 6 to 18 months in ‘stimulus package 1’; subsequently it has been 
further extended, and the level of government support increased. The Austrian short-
time working scheme has also been extended, from 1 year to 18 months, with 
possibilities for further prolongation under specific circumstances. In Belgium, the 
amounts of compensation payable under the partial unemployment scheme for blue-
collar workers have been increased from 60% to 70% (for childless couples) and 65% 
to 75% (for single people and couples with children) of the worker’s salary. A new 
temporary unemployment scheme, also applicable to white collar workers and 
replacing 70 to 75% of lost income for a set period, has also been introduced. These 
examples are merely typical of the reforms in this area, which have been adopted in 
many developed countries (see Table 1). 
 
Short-time working measures have the obvious political advantage of preventing a 
rise in the unemployment rate, as beneficiaries usually retain their employee status. 
They have been criticised, however, both for potentially slowing adjustment by 
locking people into declining jobs and as benefiting mainly ‘insiders’ in secure 
employment in large firms (Carone et al., 2009). With respect to the latter point, it is 
however notable that in many countries the adaptation of short-time working 
arrangements in the current crisis has seen them extended to temporary or agency 
workers with fixed-term employment contracts and/or to smaller firms that have not 
benefited from such measures in the past. Furthermore, in many countries there are 
now financial incentives or even obligations for short-time working to be combined 
with retraining initiatives so that these measures do not hinder, and even contribute to, 
labour market adjustment.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Though they have been less common than temporary or partial unemployment 
measures, a number of developed countries have also, or alternatively, made selective 
improvements to support for the fully unemployed (see Table 1). These range from 
marginal measures, such as the additional child supplement for recipients of the ALG 
II unemployment assistance benefit in Germany, through to more significant 
modifications such as the easing of eligibility conditions for unemployment insurance 
in France and Sweden or the increase in the maximum reference salary for the 
calculation of unemployment insurance benefits in Belgium. Even the USA, which 
traditionally rivals Britain in reluctance to provide adequate income support to the 
out-of-work, included an exceptional unemployment insurance entitlement extension 
of 13 to 20 weeks in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 
 
Once again, these measures do not necessarily benefit only the better organised and 
most politically influential sections of the workforce. In France, for example, the 
modifications in the most recent unemployment insurance agreement have mainly 
benefited the most precarious workers by reducing the minimum contribution period 
for unemployment insurance entitlement from 6 months to 4 months. It is estimated 
that in 2009 some 100,000 workers will gain an entitlement to unemployment 
insurance that they would not have had under pre-existing rules (Les Echos, 2009). 
Furthermore, the French government has also introduced a new one-off 500 Euro 
payment for young people without a sufficient work history to access unemployment 
insurance. Finally, the aforementioned CTP, which offers 80% replacement of their 
previous gross salary and intensive help with labour market reorientation for 1 year to 
workers made redundant for economic reasons, has been extended to workers in 
companies of all sizes, having previously only applied to those in firms with over 
1000 employees.  
 
Whither the British ‘success story’? 
 
In recent years the UK has tended to be presented as a labour market policy ‘success 
story’, not least by the British government itself. This was of course possible mainly 
thanks to the output legitimacy accorded by strong employment growth and low 
(open) unemployment rates, but it was also underpinned by an assertion that UK 
labour market policy had been moved onto a post-ideological plane, allowing policy 
making in this area to concentrate on the pragmatic search for and application of ‘best 
practice’ solutions to the reconciliation of social justice and economic dynamism and 
the balancing of rights and responsibilities. Such ideas were implicit in the concept of 
the ‘third way’, in which so much recent labour market policy making in the UK has 
been framed (Finn and Schulte, 2008). 
 
If the recent rise in unemployment in the UK can perhaps be explained away with 
reference to the global crisis, the British labour market policy response to the crisis 
reveals how superficial these claims really were. As the short review above has 
demonstrated, expansions to short-time working subsidy schemes and extensions of 
unemployment benefit coverage and generosity have been a feature of the response to 
the crisis in almost every developed country except the UK, despite the fact that in 
almost all these countries the automatic stablisation effects of existing benefit 
arrangements were already far stronger. There is little that is pragmatic in the apparent 
refusal to countenance an even temporary improvement in benefits for the 
unemployed and vulnerable employed, making the UK particularly vulnerable to what 
the European Commission (2009, p. 35) have identified as a general risk of a “self-
fulfilling spiral of low aggregate demand, gloomy expectations, high uncertainty, low 
investment, high (long-term) unemployment and low consumption” should 
governments pay insufficient attention to labour market issues. 
 
Proposals to increase unemployment benefits and introduce a national scheme to 
support short-time working arrangements have been put forward by some policy 
commentators in Britain (Coats et al., 2009b; Bell and Blanchflower, 2009); the latter 
measure has also been advocated by both trade unions and employers. Such calls have 
provoked remarkably little serious debate between the main political parties, 
however2. As regards unemployment benefits, even in the face of a severe recession 
the government and opposition seem to be competing with each other mainly on how 
tightly they can turn the screws on the jobless, with the Conservatives countering the 
government’s welfare reform bill with their own proposals for a benefit system in 
which working-age claimants will have to ‘earn their benefits’ (Conservative Party, 
2008; 2009). This political climate also explains why the government’s otherwise 
sensible Future Jobs Fund programme for the long-term unemployed had to be 
accompanied with the workfare rhetoric when unveiled last year.  
 
Everything suggests that, whatever its initial electoral pay-off, the main impact of 
New Labour’s discursive move to the centre on social and labour market policy issues 
has been to shift the centre-of-gravity of labour market politics decisively rightward. 
Quantitative opinion research carried in 2003 revealed a ‘hardening’ of popular 
attitudes towards working-age welfare claimants and the poor in the UK, particularly 
among those on the political left (Sefton, 2004). More qualitative research carried out 
recently, as part of the government’s welfare reform consultations, reportedly 
underscored this conclusion, even though the research had been conducted with the 
economic crisis already gathering pace (The Guardian, 2008). If the state of the UK’s 
public finances is the justification for the fact that little is being done to improve 
unemployment benefits in the current crisis, it is in such attitudes that we arguably 
find the ultimate explanation. 
 
The image of the UK as a labour market policy success story was always implicitly or 
explicitly comparative, usually based on an apparently flattering contrast with its large 
neighbours like France or Germany, where employment growth was stifled by high 
labour costs and overly generous benefit schemes co-managed by the trade unions and 
employers associations mindful only of the well-being of their core constituencies of 
older workers and large firms. In light of their reactions to the current crisis we might 
also temper these standard criticisms of the continental model. The speed and ease 
with which emergency benefit measures have been agreed and implemented, often on 
the back of negotiations between the social partners, show the enduring virtues of 
institutionalised social dialogue and compromise. And attempts both to broaden these 
measures to more vulnerable groups of workers and to articulate them with labour 
market reintegration initiatives demonstrate that the continental model is not 
necessarily condemned to being passive and biased towards ‘insiders’. After a decade 
of trying to export its model, perhaps it is the moment for the UK government to 
realise that it may itself have some lessons to learn. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to place the measures introduced by the UK government to deal 
with the labour market effects of the financial crisis in a comparative perspective. It 
has shown that despite the very limited potential for the UK’s pre-existing labour 
market policies to absorb a socio-economic shock of this magnitude, the government 
has done relatively little in this field relative to its counterparts in other developed 
countries. The active labour market policies it has introduced will be beneficial, and 
are broadly comparable in aim and ambition to similar measures introduced 
elsewhere. With respect to benefit policies for the actually or potentially unemployed 
workers, however, the weakness of the British response is truly striking. While 
governments elsewhere have extended their often more generous benefit provision for 
the fully and/or partially unemployed, action of this kind appears entirely at odds with 
the tenor of current UK policy debates. 
 
British policy makers in fact appear quite unique in their dogged adherence to the 
1990s mantra that adequate benefits for working age people are the enemy of 
employment. Even before the onset of the current crisis this perspective was coming 
to be seen as overly narrow. With the recession, other ‘active’ socio-economic 
functions of ‘passive’ benefit provision, such as their role in maintaining consumer 
demand, are attracting renewed attention in international policy debates. Reforms 
currently being implemented elsewhere also underscore that policies can be 
simultaneously protective and competitiveness-enhancing, as Danish and Dutch 
labour market policy development in the last 10 years had already amply 
demonstrated, and as the flexicurity concept has emphasised. If flexicurity is the 
coming paradigm for labour market policy in developed countries, the UK’s response 
to the crisis in this area only underlines how much of a laggard it risks becoming. The 
glimmer of hope is that as the crisis unfolds further, and the negative social and 
economic effects of the UK’s low protection labour market policy model become 
clearer, the anti-benefit consensus around which the politics of British labour market 
policy has revolved for the last decade might at least begin to fracture. 
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Figure 1: Public Expenditure on Labour Market Policy 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Au
str
ia
Be
lgi
um
De
nm
ark
Ge
rm
an
y
Fin
lan
d
Fra
nc
e
Gr
ee
ce
Ita
ly
Ne
the
rla
nd
s
Po
rtu
ga
l
Sp
ain
Sw
ed
en UK US
A
%
 G
DP
1997
2007
 
Source: OECD Long Time-Series for Public Expenditure on Labour Market Programmes 
 
 
Figure 2: Average Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates 
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Source: OECD Benefits and Wages Database  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Jobseeker’s Allowance 
 
The British unemployment benefit, Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA), has two elements.  
The contribution-based element lasts for six months, for those who have made 
sufficient National Insurance (social insurance) contributions.  After six months, or 
for those without enough past contributions, there is an income-based element which 
is means-tested against family income.  Amounts of JSA are flat-rate and not related 
to previous earnings.  It is currently paid at £64.30 per week (less for the under-25s), 
though the income-based elements include additions for dependents.  In both cases 
claimants must be available for, and actively seeking, work. 
  
 
Table 1: New Income Protection Measures for Partly or Wholly Unemployed 
Workers in Developed Countries 
 
Country Adaptations to short-time working 
subsidies 
Adaptations to benefits for the 
unemployed 
Austria Extension of maximum duration of 
short-time working payments 
 
Extension of unemployment support 
allowance, a scheme compensating 
individual reductions in working time that 
permit a new worker (from within defined 
unemployed target groups) to be hired 
Belgium Increased compensation rates for 
partial unemployment 
New compensation scheme for 
temporary unemployment 
Increase in maximum wage basis for the 
calculation of unemployment insurance 
benefits 
Denmark More flexible conditions for use of 
subsidised job sharing scheme - 
France Extension of maximum duration of 
compensated partial/technical 
unemployment 
Increased compensation rates for 
partial/technical unemployment  
Easier access to the benefit system for 
those with short working records 
New 500€ payment for young unemployed 
without entitlement to unemployment 
insurance 
Extension of Professional Transition 
Contract, providing 80% replacement of 
previous income to eligible workers 
Germany Extension of maximum duration of 
short-time working payments 
Increased government contribution to 
firms 
100€ benefit supplement for non 
contributory unemployment benefit (ALG 
II) recipients beneficiaries with children 
Greece New scheme for the protection of 
employees on reduced working hours 
in medium-size companies 
- 
Italy Extension of Wage Guarantee Fund 
(CIG) to cover previously excluded 
firms 
New support for partially unemployed 
workers not covered by CIG from 
unemployment insurance fund 
- 
Netherlands Extension of scheme for short-time 
working to cover firms in difficulty 
due the economic crisis (expired 
March 2009) 
New scheme to compensate partial 
unemployment (introduced May 
2009) 
- 
Portugal New Employment Qualification 
Programme for Workers with reduced 
hours 
Temporary increase in maximum duration 
of entitlement to non-contributory ‘social 
benefit for unemployment’ scheme 
Spain Extension of unemployment benefit 
entitlement to partially unemployed 
New six month training benefit for those 
whose unemployment benefit entitlement 
has expired (proposed measure) 
Sweden - Reduction in contribution conditions for unemployment insurance entitlement 
USA - Extension to maximum period of unemployment insurance entitlement 
 
Sources: Compiled from Glassner and Galgoczi (2009); European Employment Observatory (2009); European 
Monitoring Centre on Change http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/index.htm; Mandl and Salvatore (2009) 
                                                 
1 The OECD composite replacement rate indicator is calculated as an unweighted average of 18 
different gross replacement rate calculations based on combinations of different household types, 
different unemployment durations and different levels of prior earnings. The measure covers 
contributory and non-contributory means-tested benefits, but excludes both housing-related and child-
related benefits. For details, see Martin (1996). 
2 A wage subsidy scheme called ProAct has however been introduced in Wales on a decision of the 
Welsh Assembly Government. 
